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Abstract: 
The unit of analysis in this study is mining companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange. This unit data is 
represented by the audited company's financial statements and historical data of stock prices in Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. Financial statement data and historical data of the company's stock price used are from the year of 
2009 to 2012. Companies sampled in the study only companies which meet the sampling criteria as many as 23 
companies. We find corporate governance has no Influence on the risk. The better corporate governance will 
improve financial performance. The better corporate governance will increase the firm value. The higher risk 
will lower the financial performance, while capital structure has no influence on the risk. Capital structure has 
negative Influences to financial performance. Capital structure affect negatively to firm value. The better 
financial performance will improve the firm value. 
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1. Introduction 
Mining is a risky business; business that requires large capital, and provides long-term returns then it requires 
specialized knowledge, experience and contains significant obstacles and barriers that must be overcome. (Adaro 
Energy, 2009). Mining effort required to move a very large cost, therefore the managers of mining companies 
are facing the selection of appropriate financing strategies for capital budgeting. The company in the preparation 
of capital budgeting will observe corporate governance, risk, capital structure, financial performance and firm 
value. Mining business is highly risky that the investor also requires good corporate governance in order to 
manage the risk to be as minimal as possible so that the investments can be safely implanted and provide 
maximum yield. Mining companies listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange must be running on good corporate 
governance principles of transparency, accountability, responsibility, independence, fairness and equality. To 
support the principles of good corporate governance goes well, the mining company must formed a committee 
consisting of the audit committee, risk management committee, nomination committee, and remuneration 
committee. Besides, mining companies that already implement good corporate governance also have basic 
guideline for the implementation of the company's values, business ethics, and code of conduct.  
Previous studies related to the influence of corporate governance and capital structure of the risk, financial 
performance and firm value give some inconsistent results and therefore they are inconclusive. Agency theory 
tells us that within the company there is a conflict between the manager and the employer to the need for 
oversight of the company's management in order to work for the benefit of owners of the company, thus the 
agency costs appears to reduce the risk of loss. Asymmetry theory argues that the parties relating to the company 
does not have the same information to condition of the company. The company is considered having information 
about the company's prospects and risks much better than the company owner or investor do. 
In most important business decisions, there are two key financial considerations: risk and return. Each financial 
decision presents certain risk and return characteristics, and the combination of these characteristics can increase 
or decrease a firm’s share price. Analysts use different methods to quantify risk, depending on whether they are 
looking at a single asset or a portfolio, a collection, or group of assets (Gitman and Zutter, 2012). According to 
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Weisbach (1988) more outside directors to protect shareholder interests through Influence decision control, 
while audit committee according to Klein (2006) will reduce the likelihood of earnings management that will 
further increase transparency. Reddy et al. (2010) in his research found the firm level risk is negatively related to 
insider ownership, firm level risk is positively associated with block holding, firm risk is positively related to the 
level of non-executive directors and firm level risk is positively related to board size. 
Francis and Armstrong (2003) investigated the relationship of ethics to risk management, argues that there are 
compelling reasons to consider good ethical practice to be an essential part of such risk management. Mak and 
Kusnadi (2005) examined the impact of corporate mechanisms governance in Malaysia and Singapore, found 
that a small board that is positively related to firm performance is high, while Liang and Li (1999) examined the 
relationship between board structure with firm performance in China. The results of research found a negative 
correlation between board size with firm performance. John and Senbet (1998) examined the Influence of the 
internal mechanisms and external mechanisms of corporate governance, particularly the control of the company 
by the market. They argue that corporate governance will be more independent if the board has more non-
executive directors. But some other researchers such as Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) found no significant 
relationship between the proportions of non-executive directors with firm performance. 
Klein (2006) examined whether the audit committee and board characteristic associated with earnings 
management and report resulted that earnings management is negatively related to audit committee 
independence, but Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004) investigated the influence of board of directors 
characteristics on the integrity of financial accounting report found that companies with audit committees have 
lower independent debt-financing costs.  Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) examined the relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance in the U.S. The results found no statistically significant relationship 
between ownership structure and firm performance. Statistically, managerial shareholding weakly correlated to 
firm value as measured by Tobin's Q. Coleman (2007) while Institutional shareholding increase firm value. 
Empirical evidence on the relationship between capital structures which affect firm performance results are 
diverse so that it indicates a positive relationship and others find a negative relationship of no association or even 
weak. 
According to the pecking order theory, debt negatively affects financial performance and firm value, the higher 
level of debt of a company has then the higher risk of the company. Companies that have the ability to generate 
high profits generally have low debt levels, thus it will have a lower risk. Meanwhile, according to MM theory, 
capital structure does not affect firm value, which to affects firm value is the level of profits and business risks. 
MM theory further said that value of the company with debts is higher than that of the company without debt. 
Lev (1974), n the firm level, it can be expected that large capital expenditures associated with an operating 
leverage increase will increase stock riskiness. The use of the current cost of capital as the cut-off rate would 
probably result in a decrease in stock prices, adversely affecting stockholders' wealth. Taub (1975), examined to 
ascertain the factors that influence the selection of companies in the debt to equity ratio in the United States. He 
found the coefficient of the variable measuring the difference between the return to the firm and the long term 
rate of interest was consistently positive. Thus, increases in this variable would increase the probability of debt 
IDX issued, implying a positive impact on the firms desired debt-equity ratio. Another study found a negative 
relationship between the level of leverage and firm performance is from Fama and French (2002) and Simerly 
and Li (2000). 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) in his research found that financial performance which is measured using the 
profit rate is significantly related to firm value as measured by Tobin's Q. This is consistent with the study of 
Chung et al. (2003) who found that Tobin's Q ratio (firm value) significantly has positive correlation with 
profitability (financial performance) and negatively associated with risk. Study of Demsetz and Villalonga 
(2001) and Chung et al. (2003) confirmed the MM Theory statement that the level of profits and business risks 
affects the firm value.  Results of previous studies on the influence of corporate governance, capital structure of 
the risk, financial performance, and firm value have motivated researchers to reexamine the argument that 
corporate governance and capital structure affect risk, financial performance, and firm value. 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Corporate Governance 
Agency Theory, Jansen and Meckling (1976), define an agency relationship as a contract under which one or 
more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which 
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involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. If both parties to the relationship are of 
maximum utility, there is good reason to believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the 
principal. The principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the 
agent and by incurring monitoring costs design to limit the aberrant activities of the agent. In addition, in some 
situations it will pay the agent to expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he will not take certain 
actions which would harm the principal or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does take such 
actions. Corporate governance principles developed by the OECD consists of the rights of shareholders, the 
equitable treatment of shareholders, the role of stake holders, disclosure and transparency, and the 
responsibilities of the boards. 
2.2. Risk 
According to Brealey et al., 2011 “High debt, and thus high financial risk, also appear to reduce firms’ appetites 
for business risk”, This means that there is a relationship between capital structure and the influence risk. Further 
Brealey et al., (2011) stated that Market risk (systematic risk) cannot be diversified away. Hoyt and Liebenberg 
(2011) in his research found that the company risk management has a positive relationship with firm value. 
Brigham and Daves, 2007, Market risk, on the other hand, stems from factors that systematically affect most 
firms: war, inflation, recessions, and high interest rates. Since most stocks are negatively affected by these 
factors, market risk cannot be eliminated by diversification. Market risk in this study was calculated using a 
measured beta that has the symbol β, referring to the formula in Beaver et al. (1970). 
2.3. Capital Structure 
Tahir and Razali, 2011, In the real business, it is believed that most companies use debt to finance operations. 
The sources to finance operations can be created via options, futures or other financial instruments. By 
borrowing, a company actually increases its leverage because the company grabs the opportunity to invest 
business operations without increasing its equity. As a result, it creates an opportunity for company to create 
value for its stakeholders if it is able to generate profits. Modigliani and Miller, 1963, using debt financing will 
obtain tax advantages but it does not mean that the companies should always try to use the maximum possible 
amount of debt in their capital structure. Furthermore, Modigliani and Miller (1958) stated that the capital 
structure does not affect firm value. 
2.4. Pecking-order theory  
Brealey et al., 2011, Asymmetric information affects the choice between internal and external financing and 
between new issues of debt and equity securities. This leads to a pecking order, in which investment is financed 
first with internal funds, reinvested earnings primarily; then by new issues of debt; and finally with new issues of 
equity. New equity issues are the last resort when the company runs out of debt capacity, that is, when the threat 
of costs of financial distress brings regular insomnia to existing creditors and to the financial manager. 
2.5. Modigliani and Miller theory,  
Gitman and Zutter, 2012, in 1958, Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller (commonly known as “M and M”) 
demonstrated algebraically that assuming perfect markets. The capital structure that a firm chooses does not 
affect its value. Many researchers, including M and M, have examined the Influences of less restrictive 
assumptions on the relationship between capital structure and the firm’s value. The result is a theoretical optimal 
capital structure based on balancing the benefits and costs of debt financing. The major benefit of debt financing 
is the tax shield, which allows interest payments to be deducted in calculating taxable income. The cost of debt 
financing results from (1) the increased probability of bankruptcy caused by debt obligations, (2) the agency 
costs of the lender’s constraining the firm’s actions, and (3) the costs associated with managers having more 
information about the firm’s prospects than investors do. Allowing firms to deduct interest payments on debt 
when calculating taxable income reduces the amount of the firm’s earnings paid in taxes, thereby making more 
earnings available for bondholders and stockholders. The deductibility of interest means the cost of debt to the 
firm is subsidized by the government. 
3. Hypothesis 
3.1. Influence of corporate governance on risk 
Francis and Armstrong (2003) investigated the relationship of ethics to risk management. They argue that there 
are compelling reasons to practice good ethics as an important part of risk management. Prasetyo (2011) said 
that there is a strong impact between corporate governance and systematic risk. This means that in the long term, 
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the company with the correct application of corporate governance can minimize the risk. Reddy et al. (2010) in 
his research found that the firm's risk level is negatively related to insider ownership, firm risk level is positively 
related to block holding. Firm risk is positively related to the level of non-executive directors and firm level risk 
is positively related to board size. 
H1: Corporate governance has Influence on risk. 
3.2. Influence of corporate governance on financial performance and firm value 
It is widely recognized that corporate governance increases firm performance. Although the generally accepted 
notion tells that Influence corporate governance increases firm performance, other studies have reported a 
negative relationship between corporate governance and firm performance (Bathala and Rao, 1995; Hutchinson, 
2002). Researchers predict that corporate governance will improve the financial performance and firm value. 
H2: Corporate governance has Influence on financial performance. 
H3: Corporate governance has Influence on firm value. 
3.3. Influence of risk on financial performance 
Hoyt and Libenberg (2011) found a positive relationship between firm value and the use of ERM for various 
specifications of the model that influences the alternative treatments. ERM is both statistically and economically 
significant. Chung et al. (2003) found that Tobin's Q ratio (firm value) have significance in showing positive 
association with profitability (financial performance) and negatively related to risk. 
H4: Risk have effect on financial performance. 
3.4. Influence of capital structure on risk 
Brigham and Houston (2010) that capital structure involves the existence of a trade-off between risk and return: 
1) Using a debt in larger quantities would increase the risk borne by shareholders. 
2) However, using more debt will generally increase the estimated return on equity.  
Divergent views presented by Fama and French (1997). High leverage, as well as increased leverage and debt, is 
bad news to the company's value. At high levels of leverage, agency problems between stockholder- bondholders 
may appear on risky debt. 
H5: Capital structure has Influence on risk. 
3.5. Influence of capital structure on financial performance and firm value 
Taub (1975) variable coefficient which measures the difference between the return of the company, consistently 
give positive influence with long-term interest rates. This means that an increase in return the company will 
increase the likelihood of debt issuance. This implies a positive impact on the company's debt to equity ratio 
desired. Different opinions expressed by Fama and French (2002) that a profitable company that has a smaller 
leverage and investment company that has a lot of leverage to have a smaller market. Fama and French (1997) 
support the opinion of Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977), which predicts a negative relationship 
between leverage with profitability. 
H6: Capital structure has Influence on financial performance. 
H7: Capital structure has Influence on firm value. 
3.6. Influence of financial performance on firm value 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) in his research found that financial performance which is measured using the 
profit rate is significantly related to firm value. As measured by Tobin's Q, this is consistent with the study of 
Chung et al. (2003) who found that Tobin's Q ratio (firm value) has significant positive correlation with 
profitability (financial performance) and negatively associated with risk. Study of Demsetz and Villalonga 
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(2001) and Chung et al. (2003) confirm that the MM Theory which states that affect firm value is the level of 
profits and business risks. 
H8: Financial performance has influence on firm value. 
< Figure 1 is about here > 
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1. Instrument Test 
Research is the kind of explanatory research that describes the influence of the variable X to Y through 
hypothesis testing. The unit of analysis in this study is mining companies that are listed in the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange. The data is represented by the company's financial statements that have been audited and historical 
data of stock prices in Indonesia Stock Exchange. Financial statement data and historical data of the company's 
stock price used is from the year of 2009 to 2012. The population was companies listed mining in Indonesia 
Stock Exchange the period 2009 - 2012 amounted to 36 companies. The companies that are IDX sampled in this 
study were selected based on certain criteria (purposive sampling), as below: 
1. Mining companies are already implementing good corporate governance. 
2. Mining companies have issued financial statements for the period ended December 31, during the period of 
2009-2012 and have been contained in the Indonesian Capital Market Directory (ICMD), Indonesia Stock 
Exchange website and the website of the company. 
3. In accordance with Article 3 of the Articles of Association years of 2009-2012, the Company must engage in 
mining activity or support to mining activity. 
Companies sampled in the study only companies that meet the sampling criteria as above as many as 23 
companies. 
4.2. Exogenous variable and operational variable definition 
1. Corporate Governance (X1) can be interpreted as a set of rules that govern the system and control of the 
company to create value for stakeholders, Corporate Governance in this study was measured using the 
following indicators: 
(1) Proportion of Non-Executive Director (X1.1) is the proportion of the number of Non-Executive Director 
(directors who are not affiliated) that sits on the Board of Directors. 
(2) Managerial Ownership (X1.2) is the proportion of shares held by members of the Board of Directors and 
Board of Commissioner to the total number of existing shares. 
(3) Proportion of Independent Commissioners (X1.3) is the proportion of Independent Commissioners who sit 
on the Board of Commissioners. 
(4) Proportion of Independent Audit Committee (X1.4) is the proportion number of Independent 
Commissioner in the Audit Committee. Klein (2006), to determine independence, one of three definitions 
are used is to define audit or board independence as the percentage of outside directors on the audit 
committee or on the board. 
(5) Institutional Ownership (X1.5) is the proportion of shares held by institutional to the total number of 
existing shares. 
These indicators are used as a proxy for corporate governance in influencing financial performance and firm 
value that referring to research of Coleman (2007), Reddy et al., (2010), while the indicator is used as a 
proxy for corporate governance in affecting market risk refers to the study of Reddy et al., (2010). 
2. Capital Structure (X2), capital structure is the mix of debt, preferred stock and common stock used to finance 
capital of the firm to achieve maximum value. Capital structure in this study was measured using the 
following indicators: 
(1) Debt Ratio (X2.1) is the size (proportion) of the total use of debt to finance all investment firms. 
(2) Debt to Equity Ratio (X2.2) is the ratio of debt to equity. 
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These indicators are used as a proxy for Capital Structure in affecting firm performance and firm value which 
refers to research of Zeitun and Tian (2007) and Ebaid (2009), as well as the capital structure affects risk 
referring to research of Prasad (2010). 
4.3. Endogenous variable and operational variable definition 
1. Risk (Y1), the emphasis definition of risk in this study is more on the technical risk - capital budgeting 
techniques as defined by Keown et al., (2010), namely the risk as variability that may occur regarding the 
expected revenue stream. The risk in this research is measured using the following indicators: 
(1) Market Risk (Y1.1) is part of the risk of an Influence that cannot be eliminated by diversification. 
(Brigham and Houston, 2010). Market risk in this study was calculated using a measured beta that has the 
symbol β refers to Beaver, (1970). Market Risk is used as a proxy for risk estimation of measurement that 
refers to the study of Reddy et al. (2010). 
2. Financial Performance (Y2) measured by using an indicator as follows: 
(1) Return on Investment (Y2.1) is earnings before financial expenses divided by the total funds (debt and 
equity) invested in the business. ROI as a measure of performance, used to evaluate the efficiency of an 
investment or to compare the efficiency of a number of different investments. ROI is used as a proxy 
measurement firm performance based on research from Jacobson (1987). 
(2) Return on Equity (Y2.2) is one of the ratio profitability to measures the firm in generate profit by using 
total equity existing and after expenses capital ejected from analysis. ROE used as proxy measurement 
firm performance of referring to the research of Coleman (2007); Zeitun and Tian (2007); Ebaid (2009). 
(3) Net Profit Margin (Y2.3) is percentage of net profit of income. NPM used as proxy the measurement of 
firm the performance of referred to research from Zeitun and Tian (2007). 
3. Firm Value (Y3) measured by using an indicator as follows: 
(1) Tobin’s Q (Y3.1) is the market value of the assets of the company divided by the cost of substitution (Ross 
et al. 2008). Tobin’s Q is used as a proxy measurement of market based firm value that refers to the 
research of Coleman (2007); Zeitun and Tian (2007); Ebaid (2009); Reddy et al., (2010). Calculation of 
Tobin’s Q refers to the formulation of Chung and Pruitt (1994). 
(2) Price-Earnings Ratio (Y3.2) is measured appraisement equity defined as the market price of a stock 
divided by its earnings annual per share. It can be simplified as the ratio of the total market value of 
capital income referred to research from Kravchenko and Yusupova (2005) Zeitun and Tian (2007). 
(3) Closing Price (Y3.3) is the closing stock price on the day of a certain period or on the stock exchange. 
Closing Price as an indicator of firm value refers to the research of Patell (1976). 
 
4.4. Inferential Statistical Analysis 
Inferential statistical analysis is an analysis that focuses on the areas of analysis and interpretation of data in 
order to draw conclusions. In this study there are two endogenous variables (financial performance and firm 
value) as well as eight exogenous variables ie Proportion of Non-Executive Director (X1.1), Managerial 
Ownership (X1.2), Proportion of Independent Commissioners (X1.3), Proportion of Independent Audit Committee 
(X1.4), Institutional Ownership (X1
.5), Debt Ratio (X2.1), Debt to Equity Ratio (X2.2). Inferential statistical 
method is used to analyze the variance in this study-based or component-based with Partial Least Square (PLS). 
Analysis of Partial Least Square (PLS) is a multivariate statistical technique that performs multiple comparisons 
between the dependent variable and multiple independent variables. PLS is one of the SEM-based statistical 
method is designed to solve a variant of multiple regression when there is a specific problem in the data, such as 
small sample size, the missing data (missing values) and multi co-linearity (Jogiyanto, 2009). 
5. Result of Research 
5.1. The Description of Variable  
Variable description in this research study is minimum value, maximum and average for each variable. As 
variables described are: Corporate Governance (X1), Capital Structure (X2), Risk (Y1), Financial Performance 
(Y2), and Firm Value (Y3).  
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5.1.1 Description of  Corporate Governance (X1) variable  
Corporate Governance variables in this study measured based on five indicators: Proportion of Non-Executive 
Director (X1.1), Managerial Ownership (X1.2), Proportion of Independent Commissioners (X1.3), Proportion of 
Independent Audit Committee (X1.4), and Institutional Ownership (X1.5). Descriptive analyses of the results for 
the variables are presented in Table 1. 
< Table 1 is about here > 
Based on the table 1. Then indicators of a variable of corporate governance (X1) can be interpreted as follows, 
the average proportion of non-executive director existing in the board of directors is 6.1 %, the amount of the 
number of such proportion relatively small and describe that the company has not been a lot of employing non-
executive director who dwells in the board of directors. The average managerial ownership (X1.2) or the 
proportion of the number of shares owned by the members of board of director, board of commissioner, and to 
the total number of shares the company is 6.16 %. The amount of the number of such proportion is relatively 
small. The average Proportion of Independent Commissioners (X1.3) in the Board of Commissioner is 38.33%, in 
accordance with the Law Number 40 Year 2007 on limited liability companies Article 120, paragraph 1 States 
that the articles of Association of the company can set up any one (1) or more independent Commissioner and 
one (1) person the Commissioner Delegates. Whereas according to the decision of the Board of Directors of PT 
Jakarta Stock Exchange number: Kep-305/BEJ/07-2004 Independent Commissioner of the Company must have 
at least 30% (thirty-per hundred) from the ranks of members of the Board of Commissioners. Thus the average 
Proportion of Independent Commissioners in the Board of Commissioner is fulfilling the provisions of the Law 
Number 40 year 2007 and the decision of the Board of Directors of PT Jakarta Stock Exchange number: Kep-
305/BEJ/07-2004. 
The average proportion of independent audit committee (X1.4) is 34.07 %, according to Anderson et al. (2004); 
companies that had an independent audit committee have the lower cost of financing debt. Meanwhile, according 
to the wild (1994) the market reacts well against profit after the formation of an audit committee. Klein (2006) 
found that a single negative correlation is not linear between an audit committee of independence with the 
earning management. Further, Klein suggesting that board composed of more independent of CEO influence 
more in the process of monitoring corporate finance accounting. The average institutional ownership (X1.5) or the 
proportion of the number of shares owned by institutional to the total number of shares of the company is 
58.76%. This demonstrates that most of its stock owned by mining company in Indonesia institutions.  
5.1.2 Description of Capital Structure (X2) Variable 
In this research, Capital Structure (X2) variable is measured by two indicators, namely: Debt Ratio (X2.1) and 
Debt to Equity Ratio (X2.2) as shown in Table 2. 
< Table 2 is about here > 
Referring to Table 2, obtained information that the average Debt Ratio mining company listed in the IDX was 
51.09%. The percentage figures are 51.09% of investment showed that mining company financed using debt. 
Referring to Table 5.3., obtained information that the average Debt-to-Equity Ratio recorded by mining company 
in IDX 2.6017. If the numbers of the Debt to Equity Ratio was 1, this mean that venture capital and debt are the 
same, thus the average Debt-to-Equity Ratio of 2.6017 shows that the average debt of a mining company listed 
in the IDX is bigger 2.6 times compared to capital owned. 
5.1.3 Description of Risk (Y1) and Financial Performance (Y2) Variables 
Risk (Y1) variable is only measured with a one indicator, namely Market Risk (Y1.1). In order to be efficient, this 
analysis of descriptive variable will be combined with Financial Performance (Y2). Financial Performance (Y2) 
variable is measured on 3 indicators namely: Return on Investment (Y2.1), Return on Equity (Y2.2), and Net Profit 
Margin (Y2.3) as can be seen in Table 3. 
< Table 3 is about here > 
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Referring to table 3. obtained information that the average of Market Risk (Y1.1) in mining company recorded by 
IDX is 0.8123.  According to Jogiyanto (2011), if value betas of portfolio securities are equal to one, then it 
means that transforming return of x % market will cause return of securities or that of a changeable also portfolio 
of x %. If the value of betas equal to zero, that means transforming return of x % market will not cause to return 
or portfolio securities were changeable. The bigger numbers betas of a corporation stock, the higher are the 
levels of risks. Referring to table 5.3. obtained information that the average of Return on Investment (Y2.1) in 
mining company recorded by IDX is 0.0865. This means that the average investment in mining company 
recorded by IDX will give a profit of 8.65 % per year. The bigger numbers ROI will be even better. 
Referring to Table 3. obtained information that the average of Return on Equity (Y2.2) in mining company 
recorded by IDX is 0.1345. In accounting this means that the average of any rupiah in equity mining company 
recorded by IDX will yield a profit of 1.45 % per year. The bigger numbers ROE will be even better. Referring 
to Table 3. obtained information that the average Net Profit Margin (Y 2) in mining company listed in the IDX 
were-accounting basis. This 0.9179 means that on average, each sale by a mining company listed in the IDX will 
result in a loss of-91.79% per year. Figures for Net Profit Margin were negative. It's common for new mining 
companies or new project investment because in the income statement, the company's costs must be included as 
income of the company or the investment of the new project does not exist or it has not been maximized. The 
larger the number the Net Profit Margin will be even better. 
5.1.4 Description of  Firm Value (Y3) variable 
Firm Value (Y3) variable in this research will be measured by 3 indicators: Tobin’s Q (Y3.1), Price-Earnings 
Ratio (Y3.2), and Closing Price (Y3.3) as described in Table 4. 
< Table 4 is about here > 
Referring to Table 4. Obtained information that the average of Tobin’s Q (Y3.1) of mining company listed in the 
IDX was 1.4996, according to James Tobin (1969) in the Ang and Beck (2000), when numbers of Tobin’s Q > 1 
then the investment can be made. Referring to Table 4. obtained information that the average Price-Earnings 
Ratio (Y3.2) of mining company listed in the IDX was 0.1647. The value of the average Price-Earnings Ratio of 
0.1647 means that the average shares of mining company listed in the JSX sold for 0.1647 times to its profits 
.The average Price-Earnings Ratio of companies listed at the IDX mines can be caused by a decline in the stock 
price trend of mining company listed in the IDX. Referring to the table 4. obtained information that the value of 
the average of Closing Price (Y3.3) of mining company recorded by IDX is Rp. 4,814.04, while the average 
composite index (JKSE) a period 2009-2012 rp3,468.07. This could be meant that the average Closing Price 
(Y3.3) of mining company recorded by IDX having the better prospect above average listed company in IDX. 
The assumption in the PLS analysis is that the relationship between variables is linear, so-called assuming 
linearity. Test on this assumption is done with the approach of curve fit; where assuming linearity has been met 
if a model linear significant or whole model used as the basis of the testing insignificant. The assumption is 
drawn in Table 5. Table 5 shows that all the relations between variables is linear, thus the assumption of linearity 
has been fulfilled. 
< Table 5 is about here > 
5.2. Outer Model Evaluation 
Examination of an indicator for each variable is based on the outer weight value to a formative indicator model 
(capital structure, risk, financial performance, and firm value) and the outer loading to a reflective indicator 
model (corporate governance). The value of (score factor / components) any indicators would be easy to be 
interpreted if outer weight / loading have similar mark (in this case +). On the other hand, an indicator said to be 
valid (converging) if it is significant (see Table 6). 
< Table 6 is about here > 
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Considering an indicator of Managerial Ownership (X1.2) and proportion of Independent Commissioners (X1.3) 
are having negative value of outer loading, then these indicators are issued in measuring Corporate Governance 
(X1) variable. It will be measured again without involving indicator and the results are presented in Table 7. 
< Table 7 is about here > 
Based on the table, can be known that the institutional ownership (X1.5) having outer loading largest, so that is an 
indicator of the most powerful as a measuring variable corporate governance (X1). Outer weight for variables 
risk (Y1) is worth 1 because this variable is just measured based on a single indicator (see Table 8). 
< Table 8 is about here > 
Debt to Equity Ratio (X2.2) indicator has negative value of outer loading. That indicator is issued as a measuring 
Capital Structure (X2) variable. An indicator of Return on Equity (Y2.2) and Net Profit Margin (Y2.3) have 
negative value of outer loading, and then those indicators are issued as measuring variable. Financial 
Performance (Y2) and Price-Earnings Ratio (Y3.2) indicator have negative values of outer loading, and then those 
indicators are issued as measuring Firm Value (Y3) variable. After removing these above indicators, then the 
measurement is carried out and obtained the following results: outer weight for Risk (Y1), Capital Structure (X2) 
and the Financial Performance (Y2), is equal to 1 because this variable is just measured based on a single 
indicator (for details, please refer to Table 9). 
< Table 9 is about here > 
5.3. Goodness of Fit Inner Model 
Goodness of fit models in the PLS analysis is Q2 and it is calculated from the values of R-square. It has a value 
range of 0 < Q2 < 1. R-square is based on the coefficient of determination of the endogenous variables, as 
presented in Table 10. 
< Table 10 is about here > 
According to Table 10, Q2 can be calculated as follows: 
Q2 = 1 – (1 – 0,098)(1 – 0,234)(1 – 0,007) 
      = 0.31389 
Thus, it may say that the model can explain the phenomena which are reviewed by 31.39 %.  
5.4. The Result of Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis Testing on PLS done with t-test and in a concise manner served in Table 11. 
< Table 11 is about here > 
The results of the hypotheses testing are also shown in a form of a diagram as can be seen in Figure 2. 
< Figure 2 is about here > 
Based on Table 11 and Figure 2, the results of research hypothesis testing can be described as the following 
explanation. 
5.4.1 The Influence of Corporate Governance on Risk 
Test on hypotheses 1 indicates that corporate governance affects the risk, PLS analysis produces a path 
coefficient as much as 0,007 and p = 0,813. So, it is said to be insignificant. This means that corporate 
governance does not affect the risk in mining company in Indonesian IDX, which are listed in thus hypothesis 
was denied, 1. In other words, the practice of corporate governance also does not affect the risk of the company. 
In this research, risk proxies use market risk. This finding is not consistent with the results of research by Francis 
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and Armstrong (2003) which discovered that the practice of ethics was also an important part of risk 
management, and research by Prasetyo (2011) that there was the forceful impact between corporate governance 
and systematic risk. Other researcher, Reddy et al., (2010) reported his innovation that the firm level of risk 
associated with insiders ownership. The Firm level of risk has positive relationship with block holding, non-
executive / independent directors and board size. 
5.4.2 The Influence of Corporate Governance on Financial Performance and Firm Value 
Test on hypotheses 2 indicates that corporate governance affects the financial performance of corporations.  PLS 
analysis produces a path coefficient as much as 0,154 and p = 0.0001 which is said to be significant. Considering 
a coefficient the lane marked positive, then can be meant that better corporate governance will improve financial 
performance of Indonesian mining company listed in IDX. Thus, hypothesis 2 is accepted. Test on hypotheses 3 
indicates that corporate governance is influential favorably to firm value. PLS analysis produce a path coefficient 
as much as 0,184 and p = 0,035. So it is said to be significant. Considering a coefficient of the lane marked 
positive, then it can be meant that better corporate governance will increase the firm value of Indonesian mining 
companies listed in IDX. Thus, hypothesis 3 is accepted. 
This finding is consistent with the research results by Coleman (2007), that the Audit Committee is another 
mechanism of internal governance that impact to improve the quality of financial management and  performance 
of the company. However, very few empirical studies have been done on the impact of the audit committee of 
firm performance. According to John and Senbet (1998), a more independent board has more non-executive 
directors (Non-Executive Directors/NEDs). Weisbach (1988), Cotter, Shivdasani, Zenner (1997) and Coleman 
(2007) supports this view underlines the importance of the role of the Board of Directors of beyond in protecting 
shareholders' interests through Influence decision controls. Klein (2002) found that the number of audit 
committee independence increases with increasing board size and board independence, and decreased in line 
with the decline in the company's growth opportunities and the company reported losses in a row. Moreover, 
Klein (2006) found that there is a non-negative linear relationship between audit committee independence and 
earnings manipulation. 
Referring to a Table 5.7, it says that Institutional Ownership (X1.5) has outer loading largest, so that it is an 
indicator of the most powerful as a measuring Corporate Governance (X1) variable. As the rate of outer loading 
institutional ownership is positive, thus it means that institutional ownership has the greatest contribution. Good 
Corporate governance also increases financial performance and firm value. It is consistent with the results of the 
research of Chen et al. (2008) declaring that institutional investors can give positive contributions through the 
cost supervision that may influence management behavior. 
5.4.3 The Influence of Risk on Firm’s Financial Performance 
Test on hypotheses 4 stating that risk affects the financial performance of corporations. PLS analysis produce a 
path coefficient as much as -0,081 and p = 0,020 so it is said to be significant. Considering a coefficient of the 
lane marked negative then it means that the higher risk would lower financial performance of the Indonesian 
mining company listed in IDX. Therefore, hypothesis 4 is accepted. According to the pecking order theory, a 
company that has the ability to generate high profit generally has a low debt level, thus it will have a low level of 
risk. Research results by Chung et al. (2003) found that the Tobin’s Q ratio (firm value) is associated positively 
with significant profitability (financial performance) and is associated with negative risk. During this research, 
the knowledge of the theory and research that there's been more discussed about the influence of the financial 
performance and firm value against the risk. Researchers in this study tried to do the contrary i.e. how influence 
risk of financial performance, particularly in mining company listed in the IDX, can be a novelty in this research. 
According to the financial report 2009 PT Adaro Energy Tbk, mining is a risky business. Businesses that require 
huge capital, long-term, and yields slow. It takes specialized knowledge, experience and contains significant 
barriers and obstacles that must be overcome. This business is governed by strict regulation, brings great 
influence on the community, and always relevant and potentially exposed to the negative influences of the 
volatility of commodity markets in terms of costs and revenues.  
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5.4.4 The Influence of Capital Structure on Risk 
Test on hypothesis 5 is stating that capital structure affects the risk. PLS analysis produces a path coefficient as 
much as 0,085 and p = 0,076, so it is said to be insignificant. This can be inferred that capital structure does not 
affect the risk in mining company in listed in IDX. Thus hypothesis 5 is rejected. The finding is not consistent 
with the opinions of pecking order theory that the higher levels of debt of an enterprise, the higher the risk of the 
company will be. Companies that had the ability to generate high profit, on generally will have a low debt and 
thus it will have low risk. These findings confirm the MM Theory which says that capital structure does not 
affect the firm value. Factor which influences the firm value is the level of profit and business risk. Furthermore, 
MM Theory says that the value of debt has turned a company with debt to have higher value compare to 
companies with no debt. The implications of the MM Theory, companies can use debt as much as possible, but 
this theory cannot be applied for granted owing must meet several assumptions. According to Brigham and 
Houston (2011) the assumptions that became the basis of the study is not a realistic assumption MM, so that the 
results are subject to be questioned. 
5.4.5 The Influence of Capital Structure on Firm’s Financial Performance  
Test on hypothesis 6 is stating that capital structure affects the financial performance of companies. PLS analysis 
produces a path coefficient as much as -0,215 and p = 0,0008. So, it is said to be significant. Considering a 
negative coefficient of the lane, it means that the higher capital structure will lower the financial performance of 
mining companies listed in IDX. Thus hypothesis 6 is accepted. This findings confirm the pecking order theory 
that is supported by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), Fama and French (1997), which predicts a 
negative relationship between leverage and profitability. Pecking order theory States that debt affect negatively 
to financial performance and firm value, the higher the level of indebtedness of a corporation then the higher the 
risk of the company. The company has the ability to generate high profit generally has a low debt level, thus it 
will have a low risk. These findings are also consistent with the results of the research of Zeitun and Tian (2007) 
that tested the relationship between capital structure and firm performance in Jordan. The results show that the 
level of debt is associated with the negative performance (both accounting and market-based measurement), as 
well as research from Ebaid (2009), that the capital structure affects negatively to firm performance. 
5.4.6 The Influence of Capital Structure on Firm Value 
Test on hypothesis 7 says that capital structure affects the firm value. PLS analysis produces a path coefficient as 
much as -0,131 and p = 0,013.  So it is said to be significant. Considering a coefficient the lane is negative, it 
could mean that the higher capital structure will lower the value of mining companies in Indonesia. Thus, 
hypothesis 7 is accepted. These findings confirm the pecking order theory describing the negative impact of debt 
on the financial performance and firm value. The higher the level of indebtedness of a corporation then the 
higher the risk of the company will be. The company which has the ability to generate high profit generally has a 
low debt level, thus will have a low risk. These findings are consistent with the results of the research of Zeitun 
and Tian (2007) that test the relationship between capital structure and firm performance in Jordan, the results 
show that the level of debt associated with the negative performance (both accounting and market-based 
measurement), as well as research from Ebaid (2009), that the capital structure affects firm performance 
negatively. 
5.4.7 The Influence of Financial Performance on Firm Value 
Test on hypothesis 8 asserts that financial performance is favorably influential to firm value. PLS analysis 
produces a path coefficient as much as 0,343 and p = 0,0017. So, it is said to be significant. Considering a 
coefficient of the lane is positive, this indicates that the better financial performance will increase the firm value 
of mining companies listed in IDX. Thus, hypothesis 8 is accepted. These findings confirm the MM Theory 
stating that some factors that affect firm value are the level of profit and business risk. These findings are 
consistent with the results of the research of Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). They found that financial 
performance measured using profit rate is associated significantly with the firm value measured using Tobin% 
u2019s Q. It is also consistent with the results of the study by Chung et al. (2003). He found that% u2019s Tobin 
Q ratio (firm value) corresponds to a significant result with profitability (financial performance) and negatively 
correlated with risk. The main purpose of the company is to maximize firm value. The purpose of this does not 
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only bring benefits for shareholders, but also provide the best benefits for society (Keown, et al 2004). An 
increase in firm value can be achieved if the company can achieve the targeted profit. 
6. Concluding Remarks 
6.1. Conclusion 
Based on the presented findings of the research, then researchers come to some following conclusions: 
1. Corporate Governance has no Influence to the Risk on a mining company in Indonesia listed in the IDX. in 
other words, a good corporate governance practices at a mining company in Indonesia which is recorded in 
IDX has no Influence to the risk. Risk proxies in this study uses market risk; 
2. The better corporate governance will improve Financial Performance. This finding confirmed some previous 
studies suggesting that corporate governance is influential favorably to firm performance; 
3. The better Corporate Governance will increase the Firm Value; 
4. The higher Risk will lower the Financial Performance. This finding is a novelty in this research because all 
this knowledge, theories and research researcher that there has been more discussed are about the influence 
of the financial performance and firm value against the risk. Researchers in this study tried to do the study 
instead how the influence of risk in correspond to firm financial performance, particularly in mining 
companies listed in the IDX; 
5. Capital Structure has no Influence on the Risk. These findings confirm the MM Theory which says that 
capital structure does not affect firm value. What influences the firm value is the level of profit and business 
risk. Further, MM Theory says that the value of a company with debt has turned out to be higher compare to 
companies with no debt; 
6. Capital structure has negative Influences to Financial Performance. These findings confirm pecking order 
theory that is supported by Jensen and Meckling (1976), Myers (1977), Fama and French (1997) who predict 
negative relationship between leverage and profitability; 
7. Capital Structure affects negatively to Firm Value. These findings confirm the pecking order theory 
describing the negative impact of debt on the financial performance and firm value. The higher the level of 
indebtedness of a corporation, then the company will have higher risk. The company has the ability to 
generate high profit generally has a low debt level, thus will have a low risk; and 
8. The better Financial Performance will improve Firm Value. These findings confirm the MM Theory stating 
the factors that affect the firm value are the level of profit and business risk. This is in accordance to the 
results of the research by Demsetz and Villalonga (2001). They found that financial performance which is 
measured using the profit rate is associated significantly with the firm value measured using Tobin’s Q. It is 
also consistent with the results of the study by Chung et al. (2003) saying that Tobin’s Q ratio (firm value) 
corresponds to a significant result with profitability (financial performance) and connects it with the negative 
risk. 
 
6.2. Research Limitations and Suggestions 
Suggestions in this research were given based on the findings of research and the limitations of research: 
1. Risk in this research is only using market risk by the use of a parameter betas share. Formerly, researchers 
will use market risk by the use of a parameter betas stock and accounting risk by using the parameters betas 
ROA, but researchers have difficulty to obtain data of quarterly report from the mining companies which will 
be used as sample. This is because not all companies publish financial report on the website www.IDX.co.id 
every 3 months. Researcher suggested experimental work which will generate variable risk which can be 
proxied by some risk indicators like degree of operating leverage, degree of financial leverage, variability of 
ROA, and other. 
2. Ownership, the Proportion of Independent Commissioners, the Proportion of Independent Audit Committee, 
and Institutional Ownership, turns out to be a significant positive coefficient has a value and just Proportion 
of the Non-Executive Director, Proportion of Independent Audit Committee and Institutional Ownership. For 
the future research, it is recommended to include other indicators such as numbers of directors in board 
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meeting, numbers of board commissioners meeting, numbers of audit committee meeting, disclosure, 
proportion of foreign ownership, the proportion of public shares, and more.  
3. Capital structure in this study proxy using indicators of debt ratio and the debt to equity ratio. Debt 
coefficient numbers and equity ratio in this study are negative, so it can't be used together with the debt ratio. 
One of the findings in this study is the Influence of capital structure toward the risk proxies that use market 
risk which is found to be not significant and not influential. This may imply that the debt increases when 
there is no Influence against market risk. Therefore, researchers suggest that research in the future should 
include the indicator proportion of foreign debt to total assets. Investigators suspect that debts from foreign 
financial institutions or foreign stock ownership also can improve financial performance and can also protect 
the firm from business risks. 
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Figure 1. Hypothesis Model 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. A Diagram of the Result of Hypothesis Testing 
Note: 
S = Significant 
NS = Non Significant 
 
Table 1. A Descriptive Analysis of the Results for Corporate Governance (X1) variable 
Indicator Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
(1) Proportion of Non-Executive Director (X1.1). 0 1.00 0.0610 0.14527 
(2) Managerial Ownership (X1.2). 0 0.71 0.0616 0.16962 
(3) Proportion of Independent Commissioners (X1.3). 0.20 0.50 0.3833 0.08361 
(4) Proportion of Independent Audit Committee (X1.4). 0 0.67 0.3407 0.09237 
(5) Institutional Ownership (X1.5).  0 0.99 0.5876 0.23676 
Source: Secondary Data Processed in 2013    
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Table 2. A Descriptive Analysis Of The Results for Capital Structure (X2) variable. 
Indicator Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
(1) Debt Ratio (X2.1). 0.17 0.98 0.5109 0.20327 
(2) Debt to Equity Ratio (X2.2).  0.21 55.16 2.6017 6.84044 
 Source: Secondary Data Processed in 2013   
Table 3. A Descriptive Analysis Of The Results for Risk (Y1) and Financial Performance (Y2) Variable. 
Variable/Indicator Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Risk (Y1) 
(1)  Market Risk (Y1.1). -1.16 6.41 0.8123 1.01190 
Variable Financial Performance (Y2) 
(1) Return on Investment (Y2.1).  
-0.22 1.20 0.0865 0.17419 
(2) Return on Equity (Y2.2). 
-1.80 4.14 0.1345 0.53227 
(3) Net Profit Margin (Y2.3). 
-126.08 26.32 -0.9179 13.70906 
Source: Secondary Data Processed in 2013   
Table 4. A Descriptive Analysis Of The Results for Firm Value (Y3) Variable 
Indicator Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
(1) Tobin’s Q (Y3.1). 0.22 7.45 1.4996 1.52909 
(2) Price-Earnings Ratio (Y3.2). 
-1.29 2.55 0.1647 0.44330 
(3) Closing Price (Y3.3). 50 50750 4814.04 9880.900 
Source: Secondary Data Processed in 2013   
Table 5. The result of Assumption Linearity Testing 
No The Relationship Between Variables Hypothesis Testing Description 
1 Corporate Governance (X1) Risk (Y1) All Models Insignificant Linier 
2 Corporate Governance (X1) Financial Performance (Y2) All Models Insignificant Linier 
3 Corporate Governance (X1) Firm Value (Y3) All Models Insignificant Linier 
4 Risk (Y1) Financial Performance (Y2) All Models Insignificant Linier 
5 Capital Structure (X2) Risk (Y1) All Models Insignificant Linier 
6 Capital Structure (X2) Financial Performance (Y2) All Models Insignificant Linier 
7 Capital Structure (X2) Firm Value (Y3) All Models Insignificant Linier 
8 Financial Performance (Y2) Firm Value (Y3) All Models Insignificant Linier 
Source: Secondary Data Processed in 2013   
Table 6. Complete Outer Loading Indicators for Corporate Governance (X1) Variable 
Indicator Outer Loading p-value Description 
Proportion of Non-Executive Director (X1.1). 0.552111 0.0178 Positive  
Managerial Ownership (X1.2). -0.161160 0.2630 Negative 
Proportion of Independent Commissioners (X1.3). -0.343509 0.0488 Negative 
Proportion of Independent Audit Committee (X1.4). 0.263837 0.1724 Positive 
Institutional Ownership (X1.5).  0.597874 0.0099 Positive 
Source: Secondary Data Processed in 2013   
Table 7. Outer Loading Indicator Marked Positive For Corporate Governance (X1) Variable 
Indicator Outer Loading p-value 
Proportion of Non-Executive Director (X1.1). 0.361553 0.0248 
Proportion of Independent Audit Committee (X1.4). 0.391122 0.0422 
Institutional Ownership (X1.5).  0.814152 0.0000 
Source: Secondary Data Processed in 2013   
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Table 8.  Complete Outer Loading Indicators for Capital Structure (X2), Financial Performance (Y2) and Firm Value 
(Y3) Variables 
Variable/Indicator Outer Weight p-value Description 
Capital Structure (X2)    
Debt Ratio (X2.1). 1.192769 0.0017 Positive 
Debt to Equity Ratio (X2.2).  -0.788877 0.0511 Negative 
Financial Performance (Y2)    
Return on Investment (Y2.1).  2.035569 0.0017 Positive 
Return on Equity (Y2.2). -1.492016 0.0511 Negative 
Net Profit Margin (Y2.3). -0.113301 0.2589 Negative 
Firm Value (Y3)    
Tobin’s Q (Y3.1). 0.411725 0.0717 Positive 
Price-Earnings Ratio (Y3.2). -0.114281 0.2899 Negative 
Closing Price (Y3.3). 0.682591 0.0141 Positive 
Source: Secondary Data Processed in 2013   
Table 9. Outer Weight indicator Positive For Firm Value (Y3) 
Variable/Indicator Outer Weight p-value 
Tobin’s Q (Y3.1). 0.506851 0.0196 
Closing Price (Y3.3). 0.589826 0.0125 
Source: Secondary Data Processed in 2013   
Table 10. Goodness of Fit Model 
No Endogenous Variable  R-square 
1 Risk (Y1) 0.098412 
2 Financial Performance (Y2) 0.233638 
3 Firm Value (Y3) 0.006994 
Source: Secondary Data Processed in 2013   
Table 11. The Result of Research Hypothesis Testing 
No The Relationship Between Variables Path Coefficient p-value Descriptive 
1 Corporate Governance (X1) Risk (Y1) 0.007254 0.8130 Non Significant  
2 Corporate Governance (X1) Financial Performance (Y2) 0.153680 0.0000 Significant 
3 Corporate Governance (X1) Firm Value (Y3) 0.184423 0.0355 Significant  
4 Risk (Y1) Financial Performance (Y2) -0.081374 0.0204 Significant 
5 Capital Structure (X2) Risk (Y1) 0.085415 0.0759 Non Significant 
6 Capital Structure (X2) Financial Performance (Y2) -0.214481 0.0008 Significant 
7 Capital Structure (X2) Firm Value (Y3) -0.130727 0.0133 Significant 
8 Financial Performance (Y2) Firm Value (Y3) 0.342956 0.0017 Significant 
Source: Secondary Data Processed in 2013 
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